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Abstract
We investigate quantitative implications of precautionary demand for money
for business cycle dynamics of velocity and other nominal aggregates. Account-
ing for such dynamics is a standing challenge in monetary macroeconomics:
standard business cycle models that have incorporated money have failed to
generate realistic predictions in this regard. In those models, the only un-
certainty affecting money demand is aggregate. We investigate a model with
uninsurable idiosyncratic uncertainty about liquidity need and find that the
resulting precautionary motive for holding money produces substantial quali-
tative and quantitative improvements in accounting for business cycle behavior
of nominal variables, at no cost to real variables.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we study, theoretically and quantitatively, aggregate business cycle
implications of precautionary demand for money. It is an outstanding challenge
in the literature to account for business cycle behavior of nominal aggregates and
their interaction with real aggregates. Business cycle models that have tried to
incorporate money through, for example, cash-in-advance constraints, have done
so while assuming that agents face only aggregate risk, which has resulted in the
demand for money being largely deterministic, in the sense that the cash-in-advance
constraint almost always binds. Such models have unrealistic implications for the
dynamics of nominal variables, as well as for interaction between real and nominal
variables, when compared to data (see, e.g., Cooley and Hansen, 1995).
Yet precautionary motive for holding liquidity seems to be strong in the data,
and its nature suggests that idiosyncratic risk may play a key role for money de-
mand, as shown in Telyukova (2009). In that paper, it is documented, for example,
that the median household has about 50% more liquidity than it spends on average
per month, and that controlling for observables, liquid consumption exhibits volatil-
ity consistent with the presence of significant idiosyncratic risk. Thus, aggregate
implications of idiosyncratic risk and resulting precautionary money demand are
important to investigate, especially given the unresolved questions regarding mon-
etary business cycles. The goal of this paper is to conduct such an investigation.
The set of questions we want to answer is: What are the aggregate implications of
precautionary demand for money? Can it help account for business cycle dynamics
of velocity of money, interest rates and inflation, and their interaction with real
variables?
Existing monetary business cycle models that incorporate money demand via a
cash-in-advance constraint, such as cash-credit good models, calibrated to aggregate
data, cannot account for aggregate facts such as variability of velocity of money,
correlation of velocity with output growth or money growth, correlation of inflation
with nominal interest rates, and others, as Hodrick, Kocherlakota and Lucas (1991)
have shown. The reason is that in such models, the only type of uncertainty the
households face in these models is aggregate uncertainty. The magnitude of this
uncertainty in the data is not large enough to generate significant precautionary
motive for holding money in the model, so that the cash-in-advance constraint almost
always binds. Then, money demand in the model is made equivalent to cash-good
consumption, tightly linking volatility of money demand to volatility of aggregate
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consumption. Aggregate consumption, in turn, is not volatile enough in the data
to generate observed volatility of money demand (or its inverse, velocity) or other
nominal aggregates.
We show that incorporating precautionary demand for money generated by
unpredictable idiosyncratic variation, in combination with aggregate uncertainty,
makes a crucial difference in the ability of the model to account for monetary facts
mentioned above, by breaking the link between money demand and aggregate con-
sumption. Agents generally hold more money than they spend, and money demand
is no longer linked to average aggregate consumption, but rather to consumption
of agents whose preference shock realizations make them constrained (i.e. they
spend all of their balances) in trade. We show that velocity of money can be signifi-
cantly more volatile in this heterogeneous-agent setting, thanks to the unconstrained
agents, who are absent in previous models with only aggregate risk. The presence of
both constrained and unconstrained households is key to the qualitative and quan-
titative results. In other words, idiosyncratic risk in this context does not average
out in a way that can be adequately captured by a representative agent model, as
Hodrick et al (1991) in fact anticipated in the discussion of their results (p. 380).
In addition, the magnitude of idiosyncratic volatility is much higher than aggregate
volatility: the standard deviation of aggregate consumption is 0.5%; we will measure
the standard deviation of idiosyncratic consumption shocks to be around 19%.
We study this link qualitatively and quantitatively in a model that combines, in
each period, two types of markets in a sequential manner, and where both aggregate
and idiosyncratic uncertainty are present. The first-subperiod market is a standard
Walrasian market, which we will term, somewhat loosely, the “credit market”. The
second market is also competitive, but characterized by anonymity and the absence
of barter possibility, which makes a medium of exchange - money - essential in trade.
We term this market the “cash market”. This setup is consistent with both cash-
credit good models a la Lucas and Stokey (1987) and monetary search models in
the style of Lagos and Wright (2005).1 The credit market is much like a standard
real business cycle model, with the production function being subject to aggregate
productivity shocks. Two features distinguish this market from the RBC framework.
First, households have to decide how much money to carry out of this market for
future cash consumption. Second, part of the output in the credit market is carried
into the cash market by retail firms, who buy these goods on credit and subsequently
1Indeed, idiosyncratic preference shocks could be reinterpreted in the theoretical context as
idiosyncratic matching shocks (Wallace 2001). This parallel is less applicable when we think about
empirical counterparts of preference shocks.
3
transform them into cash goods. This introduces an explicit link between the real
and monetary sectors of the economy, as credit-market capital becomes indirectly
productive in the cash market.
At the start of the second-subperiod cash market, agents are subject to unin-
surable idiosyncratic preference shocks which determine how much of the cash good
they want to consume, but the realization of the shock is not known at the time
that agents make their portfolio decisions. This generates precautionary motive for
holding liquidity. In our model, we are able to show analytically how the idiosyn-
cratic shocks, and the resulting heterogeneity of households with respect to being
constrained in the cash market, result in amplified dynamics of velocity of money.
We also show that absent idiosyncratic shocks, the model produces counterfactual
price and other nominal dynamics for values of the coefficient of relative risk aversion
in the standard range in RBC literature.
Another contribution of our work is the calibration of the model. To our knowl-
edge, all the existing models of the types mentioned above that have looked at
aggregate behavior of nominal variables have been calibrated to aggregate data. In-
stead, we also use micro survey data on liquid consumption from the Consumption
Expenditure Survey, like in Telyukova (2009), to calibrate idiosyncratic preference
risk in our cash market. Using these data, we are able to discipline our calibration
further than is commonly the case. In general, preference risk of the type that cre-
ates precautionary liquidity demand has not been measured in calibration of other
aggregate models, and in the few contexts where precautionary liquidity demand
has appeared, it has been treated as a free parameter (e.g. Faig and Jerez, 2007).
Our use of micro data allows us to be very disciplined in our approach.
Once calibrated, we solve the model computationally to investigate the effects
of real productivity shocks and monetary policy shocks. We find that precautionary
demand for money makes a dramatic difference for the model in terms of helping
it account for a variety of dynamic moments related to nominal aggregates in the
data. We test these results by also computing a version of the model where we
shut down the idiosyncratic risk, and find that without it, the model is incapable of
reproducing any of the key nominal moments in the data, much as previous literature
has suggested.
Our results lead us to conclude that in many monetary contexts, especially those
aimed at accounting for aggregate data facts, it is important not to omit idiosyn-
cratic uncertainty that gives rise to precautionary demand for money. As one exam-
ple, omitting this empirically relevant mechanism may cause the standard practice
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of calibrating monetary models to the aggregate money demand equation, as has
been done in many cash-in-advance models and monetary search models, to pro-
duce misleading results for parameters and incorrect quantitative implications. We
demonstrate this by calibrating a version of the model without idiosyncratic shocks
to target some data properties of aggregate money demand. With this targeting, we
find that, first, the model requires some parameter values well outside the standard
range in macroeconomics (e.g. a very low risk aversion parameter), and second, even
when the model targets money demand, its quantitative performance is still far infe-
rior to the model with precautionary demand, along both nominal and, importantly,
real dimensions.
This paper is related to several strands of literature. On the topic of precau-
tionary demand for liquidity,2 the key mechanism in our model is close to Faig and
Jerez (2007), Telyukova and Wright (2008) and Telyukova (2009). In Telyukova and
Wright (2008) and Telyukova (2009), the idiosyncratic uncertainty about liquidity
need is shown, respectively theoretically and quantitatively, to be relevant for house-
hold portfolio decisions to hold liquid assets and credit card debt simultaneously.
Faig and Jerez (2007) look at the behavior of velocity and nominal interest rates
over the long run. They find that with precautionary liquidity demand, the simu-
lated time series of velocity over the last century, interpreted as a series of steady
states, fits the empirical series well. Lagos and Rocheteau (2005) study steady state
properties of a monetary economy with idiosyncratic preference shocks. 3 On the
broad subject of accounting for aggregate behavior of nominal variables, a recent
paper is Wang and Shi (2006). In their model, however, search intensity is the key
mechanism behind velocity fluctuations over the business cycle.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and charac-
terizes the equilibrium. Section 3 demonstrates analytically the impact of precau-
tionary demand for money on the dynamic behavior of money, velocity and interest
rates. Section 4 describes our calibration strategy, and section 5 details the solu-
tion algorithm. Section 6 presents our results and discusses the quantitative role
2The subject of precautionary money demand goes back to at least Keynes(1936), who de-
fined its reason as “to provide for contingencies requiring sudden expenditure and for unforeseen
opportunities of advantageous purchases”. Precautionary demand for money is often modeled in
Baumol-Tobin-style inventory-theoretic models, from Whalen (1966) to fully dynamic stochastic
models such as Alvarez and Lippi (2009). Uninsurable idiosyncratic liquidity shocks are also an
essential element of models based on Diamond and Dybvig (1983). Lucas (1980) studies the equi-
librium in a cash-in-advance model with precautionary demand for money.
3In another paper on the broad subject of precautionary money demand, Hagedorn (2008) shows
that that strong liquidity effects can arise when precautionary demand for money is taken into
account in a cash-credit good model with banking.
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of precautionary liquidity demand. We then discuss how omission of precautionary
demand may lead model calibration and implications astray (section 7) and show
how precautionary demand affects welfare costs of inflation (section 8). Section 9
concludes.
2 Model
The economy is populated by a measure 1 of households, who live infinitely in dis-
crete time. The households rent labor and capital to firms, consume goods bought
from the firms, and save. There are two types of markets open sequentially during
the period. In the first subperiod, a Walrasian market is open, in which all parties
involved in transactions are known and all trades can be enforced; thus, intertem-
poral trade and asset trading are possible. In the second subperiod, the market is
competitive, in the sense that all agents are price takers, but we assume that money
is essential in trade.4 Since in the first-subperiod market households pay with either
cash or credit for consumption, and as we discuss below, retail firms buy on credit,
we will refer to this as the “credit market”, while the second subperiod - where
payment takes place using money only - will be termed the “cash market”.
There are two types of firms in the economy. Production firms use capital and
labor as inputs in production, and sell their output in the first subperiod. This out-
put is used for consumption and capital investment in the credit market. However,
part of the output is also bought up in the credit market by retail firms, who then
transform the goods one-for-one into retail goods to be sold in the cash market.5
2.1 Households
Households maximize lifetime expected discounted utility,
E0
[
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
U(ct)−Aht + ϑtu(qϑ,t)
)]
(1)
where 0 < β < 1. Utility achieved in each period, depends on consumption ct
and time spent working ht in the first subperiod, and in the second subperiod,
consumption qt and the preference shock ϑt.
6 First-subperiod utility follows the
4Temzelides and Yu (2004) derive sufficient conditions under which money is essential in com-
petitive markets. See also Levine (1991) and Rocheteau and Wright (2005).
5Our retailers are not meant to correspond one-for-one to the retail sector in the data: some
retailers in the data are better characterized as selling in the credit market, whereas the cash sector
includes firms that are not retailers.
6When subscripting our variables by t, we mean that each variable at time t is chosen conditional
on the entire history up to t; expectations are taken accordingly.
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Hansen-Rogerson specification of indivisible labor with lotteries. The taste shock ϑt
realizes when the credit market is already closed and money holdings can no longer
be adjusted, as described below. This will lead to precautionary demand for money.
The taste shock comes from a distribution with finite support.
We normalize the household’s money holdings by the aggregate money holdings.
Households start the period with normalized money holdings mt and choose m˜t
normalized money to bring into the cash market, before ϑ realizes. Households also
own capital kt and nominal bonds bt, sold to them by retail firms, as detailed below.
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We normalize the price of the credit good to one. Let wage, capital rent, real value
of one unit of normalized money, and the return on nominal bonds be wt, rt, φt, it−1.
The budget constraint, expressed in real terms, is
φtmt + (1 + rt − δ)kt + wtht + φtbt(1 + it−1) = ct + φtm˜t + kt+1 + φtbt+1 (2)
Given price ψt of the cash good, consumption qϑ in the cash market, conditional on
the preference shock realization ϑ, has to satisfy
ψtqϑ,t ≤ m˜t. (3)
Finally, hours worked are constrained,
h ∈ [0, 1]. (4)
At the beginning of the period the government makes a lump sum transfer $tMt,
where Mt is the aggregate money stock; thus, in normalized terms,
mt+1 = m˜t − ψtqϑ,t +$t. (5)
We can equivalently formulate the problem recursively under standard assumptions,
which we do below.
2.2 Production Firms
The problem of the production firm is static and completely standard – to maximize
its profits in each period. Given a constant returns to scale production function
yt = e
ztf(kt, ht), where zt is the stochastic productivity level described in more
detail below, the problem is: maxkt,ht
{
eztf(kt, ht) − wtht − rtkt}. The solution is
characterized by the usual first-order conditions.
7In principle, households can hold shares of firms as well. We will see that in our formulation
all firms make zero profits, share holding is irrelevant. Alternatively, we can formulate the economy
with firms selling shares instead of bonds; this leads to equivalent allocations of resources, but
involves more notation.
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2.3 Retail Firms
Retail firms exist for two periods: they buy the goods in the credit market, selling
nominal bonds to households to do so, sell the goods in the subsequent cash market,
and settle their debt in the following credit market, before disbanding. Free entry
in the retail market yields the following condition, expressed in nominal terms at
time t:
Πrt = max
qt
ψtqt
1 + it
−
qt
φt
= 0. (6)
All cash receipts from retail sales go towards repayment in the following credit
market; the value of this repayment is discounted to the current period using the
nominal interest rate. The repayment equals the nominal value in the current period
for the qt goods that were purchased in the credit market by the retailers. Since the
cash market is competitive, retail firms will sell all their goods in equilibrium.8
2.4 Monetary Policy and Aggregate Shocks
The monetary authority follows an interest rate feedback rule
1 + it+1
1 + i¯
=
(
1 + it
1 + i¯
)ξii (1 + pit
1 + p¯i
)ξipi (yt
y¯
)ξiy
exp(εmpt+1). (7)
The variables with bars denote central bank’s long-run target levels of output, in-
flation and the nominal interest rate. The term εmp denotes a stochastic monetary
policy shock which realizes at the beginning of the period. Consistent with the move-
ment in interest rates, the rate of money supply growth $t adjusts, thus determining
the lump-sum injections paid out to the households.
Independent from the monetary policy shock εmp, the second aggregate shock
process is on the productivity level zt. As is standard in business cycle literature,
the level of productivity follows an AR(1) of the form
zt+1 = ξzzzt + ε
z
t+1.
2.5 Recursive Formulation of the Household Problem
From now on, we will conserve notation by omitting time subscripts, and using
primes to denote t + 1. The aggregate state variables in this economy are the
aggregate capital stock, K, the technology shock z, the previous interest rate in the
economy i−1, current interest rate i, and the term (1+$−1)φ−1, which denotes the
previous period’s post-injection real value of money, and which households need to
8We assume that goods are storable, so even at zero expected real interest rate, this is without
loss of generality.
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know in order to determine the current rate of inflation in the economy. We will
denote these as S = (K, z, i−1, i, (1 + $−1)φ−1). The individual state variables at
the beginning of the centralized market are normalized money holdings m, capital
holdings k, and bond holdings b. Recall that individual money holdingsm are defined
relative to total money stock M . This renders the money holdings stationary.
Instead of writing this as a problem with separate value functions for centralized
and decentralized subperiods, we can formulate the household’s problem as a more
transparent full-period problem. This means that in the first subperiod the house-
hold can make the choices for the second subperiod, contingent on its information
at the start of the second subperiod, which is the realization of its preference shock
ϑt. In sum, we have the following recursive maximization problem:
V (k,m, b, S) = max
c,h,m˜,k′,b′,{qϑ}
{
U(c) −Ah (8)
+ Eϑ
[
ϑu(qϑ) + βEz′,i′V (k
′,m′,
b′
1 +$
,S′)
]}
s.t. c+ φm˜+ k′ + φb′ = φm+ φb(1 + i−1) + (1 + r − δ)k + wh (9)
ψqϑ ≤ m˜ (10)
pi =
(1 +$−1)φ−1
φ
(11)
1 +$ = Ω(S) (12)
m′ =
m˜
1 +$
−
ψqϑ
1 +$
+
$
1 +$
(13)
z′ =ξzzz + ε
′
1 (14)
(1˜ + i′) =ξii(1˜ + i) + ξipip˜i + ξiyy˜ + ε
′
2 (15)
The interest rate rule here is given in short hand, with x˜ referring to log-deviations of
the variable x from its target level. Given today’s aggregate states, and in particular
the nominal interest rate i between today and tomorrow, the central bank will adjust
the money growth rate to make i arise as an equilibrium price. As a result, we can
write the money growth rate as a function of the current aggregate state, as in
equation (12).
Denote the household state variables as s = (k,m, b). Denote the policy functions
of the household’s problem by g(s, S), with gx(.) as the policy function for the choice
variable x.
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2.6 Equilibrium
Definition 1. A Symmetric Stationary Monetary Equilibrium is a set of pricing
functions φ(S), ψ(S), w(S), r(S); law of motion K ′(S), value function V (s, S) and
policy functions gc(s, S), gh(s, S), gk(s, S), gb(s, S), gm(s, S), {gq,ϑ(s, S)}, all ϑ,
such that:
1. The value function solves the household optimization, in (8), with associated
policy functions, given prices and laws of motion;
2. Production and retail firms optimize, given prices and laws of motion, as in
sections 2.2 and 2.3.
3. Free entry of retailers: Πr = 0.
4. Consistent expectations: the aggregate law of motion follows from the sum of
all individual decisions (index individual households by i) –
K ′(S) =
∫ 1
0
gik(s, S)di
5. All markets clear:∫ 1
0
gim(s, S)di = 1∫ 1
0
φ(S)gib(s, S)di =
∫ 1
0
[
Eϑg
i
q,ϑ(s, S)
]
di∫ 1
0
gih(s, S)di = H(S)
(1− δ)K + ezf(H(S),K) =
∫ 1
0
gic(s, S)di+K
′(S) +
∫ 1
0
[
Eϑg
i
q,ϑ(s, S)
]
di
2.7 Walrasian Market creates Homogeneity
For general utility functions, different realizations of the idiosyncratic preference
shock would lead to a nontrivial distribution of wealth (with, for example, those
who have recently experienced a sequence of high ϑs now being poorer on average).
In turn, households with different wealth could make different portfolio decisions,
and hence the distribution across individual state variables would be relevant for
the equilibrium prices.
However, the quasi-linear specification of the problem allows equilibria in which
all heterogeneity created in the second subperiod washes out in the centralized mar-
ket.9 This occurs if the boundary conditions of h are never hit, which we assume
9This result has been used extensively in models that combine Walrasian markets with bilateral
trade and idiosyncratic matching risk, such as Lagos and Wright (2005) and Rocheteau and Wright
(2005). Here we use it to combine Walrasian markets with cash markets and idiosyncratic preference
risk.
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to be the relevant case below. Our quantitative strategy later is to solve the prob-
lem assuming that the optimal choice of h is interior, and check in our calibrated
equilibrium whether this is indeed the case.
After substituting the budget constraint for h into the household’s value function,
we can split the value function in two parts
V (s, S) =
A
(
φm+ (1 + r − δ)k + φb(1 + i−1)
w
)
+max
...
{
U(c)−A
(
c+ φm˜+ k′ + φb′
w
)
+ Eϑ
[
ϑu(qϑ) + βEz′,i′ [V (s
′, S′)]
]}
.
(16)
The following result is immediate, under the assumption of interiority on h.
Result 1. The choice of c, m˜, k′, b′ only depends on the aggregate states S.
Household wealth differs at the beginning of the Walrasian market, due to het-
erogeneous trading histories in the previous cash market, but households adjust
their hours worked to be able to get the same amount of c, m˜, k′, b′. The value func-
tion V (.) is differentiable in k,m, b, and the envelope conditions are independent of
the individual state variables. Hence, the expectation over ϑ does not matter for
intertemporal choice variables, for example:
Eϑ[Ez′,i′Vm(s, S)] = Ez′,i′Vm(s, S) = Ez′,i′
[
Aφ(S)
w(S)
]
.
The problem is weakly concave in capital, labor and bond holdings, and the
solution is interior, as long as h is interior. The Euler equations with respect to
capital and bonds, and the first-order condition with respect to labor thus look as
follows:
U ′(c(S)) = βEz′,i′ [U
′(c(S′))(1 + r(S′)− δ)] (17)
U ′(c(S)) =
A
w(S)
(18)
φU ′(c(S)) = βEz′,i′
[ φ′
1 +$
U ′(c(S′))
]
(1 + i) (19)
For future reference, we introduce the following notation, using marginal utilities
defined in terms of the marginal productivity of labor (18):
E
[
w(S)
w(S′)
]
≡ E˜, E
[
φ′(S′)
1 +$′
w(S)
w(S′)
]
≡ E˜φ′.
Note that φ
βE˜φ′
= 1 + i.
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2.8 The Choice of Money Holdings and Cash Market Consumption
Above we have discussed the Euler equations that link consumption, capital invest-
ment and bond investment between periods. Taking as given the (17)-(19), money
holdings solve the following problem
max
m˜,{qϑ}
{
− φm˜+
∑
ϑ
P(ϑ)
(ϑu(qϑ)
U ′(c)
− βE˜φ′ψqϑ
)
+ βE˜φ′m˜
}
(20)
subject to
ψ =
1 + i
φ
(21)
ψqϑ ≤ m˜ ∀ ϑ (22)
where we substitute in the equilibrium retailer zero-profit condition. Substitute out
(21), noting that βE˜φ′ψ = 1. Denote by µϑ as multipliers of (22), and by P(ϑ) the
probability of a particular shock ϑ realizing. First-order conditions then give
P(ϑ)
(
ϑu′(qϑ)
U ′(c)
− 1
)
− ψµϑ = 0 (23)
−φ+
∑
ϑ
µϑ + βE˜φ′ = 0, (24)
with the appropriate complementary slackness conditions (see characterizing equa-
tions below). It is immediate that in this model cash balances are not spent in full
for realizations of ϑ that are low enough. Since a social planner would equate U ′(c)
to ϑu′(qϑ), the following conclusions can be drawn:
Result 2. If a shock ϑ results in a nonbinding constraint, then qϑ is the efficient
quantity. Moreover, as long as the cash constraint does not bind, the quantity qϑ
does not respond to the interest rate.
Moreover, also observe that if some ϑˆ leads to a binding constraint, then for
every ϑ > ϑˆ, the cash constraint will bind. If ϑˆ leads to a slack cash constraint,
any ϑ < ϑˆ will lead to a nonbinding constraint. A binding cash constraint leads to
underconsumption of the cash good relative to the social optimum.
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2.9 Characterizing Equations
We summarize the above discussion in the system of first-order conditions and Euler
equations that characterize the equilibrium of the problem:
U ′(c) = βE[U ′(c′)(1 + r′ − δ)] (25)
U ′(c) =
A
w
ψ =
1 + i
φ
µ˜ϑ = P(ϑi)
(
ϑu′(qϑ)
U ′(c)ψ
−
φ
1 + i
)
; µ˜ϑ(m˜− ψqϑ) = 0 ∀ϑ
φ =
∑
ϑ
µ˜ϑ +
φ
1 + i
φ
1 + i
=
βE˜φ′
1 +$
y + (1− δ)k = c+ k′ +
∑
ϑ
P(ϑ)qϑ
z′ = ξzzz + ε
′
1
(1˜ + i′) = ξii(1˜ + i) + ξipip˜i + ξiyy˜ + ε
′
2
3 The Impact of Idiosyncratic Uncertainty on Nominal
Dynamics
In this section, we demonstrate analytically that there are at least three ways in
which idiosyncratic shocks to cash-good preferences can improve the quantitative
performance of the model. First, the dynamic behavior of the value of money and
prices varies significantly with the probability that the marginal dollar is spent, i.e.
that the cash constraint binds. As a result, we show that the model with idiosyn-
cratic shocks can accommodate values of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
(IES) parameter in the standard RBC calibration range (σ ∈ [1, 4]), whereas the
model without shocks would require σ < 1 (IES = 1/σ > 1) to produce realistic
dynamics of prices. Second, part of the velocity fluctuation is now generated in the
cash market, thus increasing the overall magnitude of velocity volatility, and veloc-
ity now depends in an intuitive way on nominal interest rates. Third, the standard
general-equilibrium substitution channel in cash-credit good models between cash
and credit good consumption is now dampened, because cash consumption will now
only adjust for the binding realization of the shock.
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3.1 The Dynamic Behavior of the Value of Money and Prices
The dynamic behavior of money will be an essential input for relating velocity to
interest rates. It is also, however, empirically relevant in itself: one uncontroversial
empirical regularity is the degree of persistence of interest rates, prices, and real
balances, before and after detrending, over the business cycle. Nominal interest
rates have an autocorrelation at quarterly frequency of 0.932; for real balances, it
is 0.951.10 It seems a minimally necessary requirement that a monetary business
cycle model can replicate the sign of these autocorrelations. This requirement turns
out to imply, in the absence of precautionary money demand, stringent restrictions
on the coefficient of relative risk aversion (RRA) σ. In fact, a standard range of
parameters for the RRA coefficient used in real business cycle calibration by and
large violates this restriction. With precautionary demand, it becomes possible to
use parameters in this range.
For the sake of exposition, assume two preference shock realizations ϑi, where
ϑh leads to a binding cash constraint, and ϑl to a nonbinding constraint.
11 We write
p for the probability of the high shock ϑh. Note that if we set p = 1, we are back
to the case with no idiosyncratic shocks. We simplify the utility function in the
credit market to be fully linear, U(c) = c. (We later generalize this). Reworking
the characterizing equations (25) for the binding case, we find that qh = βE˜φ′ =
(βφ′)/(1 +$), with (1 + i) = φ/(βE˜φ′), and so
φ = pϑhu
′(βE˜φ′)βE˜φ′ + (1− p)βE˜φ′. (26)
Now we can calculate what happens to the value of money today, φ, in response to
a change in the discounted value of money tomorrow, E˜φ′.
Lemma 1. The elasticity of real balances today with respect to real balances tomor-
row, ε
φ,βE˜φ′
, evaluated at an equilibrium φ, βE˜φ′, is given by
ε
φ,βE˜φ′
=
(
1−
1− p
1 + i
)
(1− σ) +
1− p
1 + i
(27)
Proof. The derivative of φ with respect to βE˜φ′, using (26), (19), (22) and m˜ = 1,
is
dφ
d(βE˜φ′)
= pϑh(u
′′(βE˜φ′)βE˜φ′ + u′(βE˜φ′)) + (1− p)
10BP-filtered, nominal interest rate from three-month treasury bonds, real money balances from
M2 and the GDP deflator (source: FRED2).
11We assume, in this example only, but not in computational work below, that as i changes, the
number of binding shocks does not. Generically, for small enough fluctuations, this assumption will
hold.
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Divide both sides by φ/(βE˜φ′), and using (26), we find
ε
φ,βE˜φ′
= p
ϑ(u′′(βE˜φ′)βE˜φ′ + u′(βE˜φ′))
pϑhu′(βE˜φ′) + (1− p)
+ (1− p)
βE˜φ′
φ
.
Rewriting this as a function of the interest rate (φ/βE˜φ′), this elasticity then becomes
equation (27). 
If this elasticity is negative, then a lower expected value of the money stock
tomorrow translates into a higher value of the money stock today. Suppose we are
in the steady state and have an expected one-time injection of money $ > 0 one
period from now. Then φ′ will be unaffected in this stationary equilibrium, since
tomorrow’s prices adjust immediately; this means that βE˜φ′ falls in proportion to
the injection 1 +$. However, this injection will raise the cash market prices today;
moreover, if ε
φ,E˜φ′
< 0, φ - the real value of money in today’s credit market - will
go up. This means that when P ′c = (1 +$)/φ
′ - the non-normalized credit market
price - goes up, Pc = 1/φ goes down. If we had an expected one-time injection two
periods from now (and no trend money growth), P ′′c would rise, P
′
c would fall, and
Pc would rise. Then, calculating the resulting nominal interest rates, we would get
a similar pattern. As a result, we get high volatility of prices and interest rates, and
counterfactual responses, in a zigzag pattern, to an expected decline in the value
of money in the future.12 Even if, with ε
φ,E˜φ′
< 0 and this volatile zigzag pattern,
the model could produce the right order of magnitude of velocity fluctuations, the
fundamental forces behind these fluctuations would be empirically invalid.
When is this elasticity negative? If p = 1 (no idiosyncratic uncertainty), this
happens when the coefficient of relative risk aversion is σ > 1. To avoid the coun-
terfactual behavior of prices and interest rates, we thus have to set σ < 1 in a
model with no idiosyncratic risk.13 However, this is smaller than the standard RRA
coefficient on consumption in the real business cycle literature.
With idiosyncratic uncertainty, we are able to put in a much higher σ: in our
setup with p < 1, the counterfactual price pattern sketched above only occurs if
σ >
1 + i
p+ i
, (28)
12In our calibration, we will have a nominal interest rate rule with persistence. Analysis of this
is a bit trickier: in a setting with p = 1 (no idiosyncratic shocks) and σ > 1, persistence in the
nominal interest rate could be achieved by alternating expansions and contractions of the money
supply. Again, this would be counterfactual.
13σ = 1 produces ε
φ,E˜φ′
= 0, i.e. φ is unresponsive to changes in i, and as a result, real money
balances and consumption velocity fluctuates extremely little. We confirm this quantitatively as
well.
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which can be significantly higher than one. The intuition for the less tight bound is
the following: the marginal unit of money is only used with probability p, while with
probability (1−p) it is not used. The value of money today is a weighted average of
the value of money in use, with probability weight p, and the value of money when
not used. Thus, a drop in the value of money tomorrow will, with probability 1− p,
contribute to a drop in the value of money today. If σ > 1, then the marginal value
of a unit of money in use will go up – the marginal utility of consumption in the
cash market increases faster than the increase in its price. However, if (28) holds,
this is now more than offset by the drop in the value of money when not used.14
3.2 The Dynamic Behavior of Velocity
The consumption velocity of money in the above example with two idiosyncratic
shocks is given by
Vc =
PC
M
=
c
φ
+ (1− p)
ql(1 + i)
φ
+ p
qh(1 + i)
φ
,
while output velocity is
Vy =
PY
M
=
(y − (1− p)ql − pqh)
φ
+ (1− p)
ql(1 + i)
φ
+ p
qh(1 + i)
φ
.
Since qh(1+i)
φ
= ψqh = m˜ = 1, we have
Vc =
PC
M
=
c
φ
+ (1− p)
ql(1 + i)
φ
+ p
Vy =
PY
M
=
(y − (1− p)ql − pqh)
φ
+ (1− p)
ql(1 + i)
φ
+ p
Let us look at consumption velocity. From the above equations, observe that, as in
standard cash-in-advance and cash-credit-good models, the constrained part of the
cash market always contributes 1 to the level of consumption velocity, and nothing
to velocity fluctuations. If p = 1, then the entire cash market does not contribute
anything directly to velocity dynamics, so that all velocity movement has to come
from the credit market - i.e. from c or φ. Instead, in our model, velocity fluctuations
are created in the cash market in addition to the credit market, thanks to the low
shocks where the cash constraint does not bind.15
14This effect occurs in general in models where, with some probability, not all money is spent,
including models with search frictions. In most calibrations in search models, nevertheless, 0 < σ <
1 is chosen; this avoids issues with negative utility when doing e.g. Nash Bargaining.
15Models with variable search intensity also create velocity fluctuations in the cash market (Wang
and Shi 2006). Standard search models with fixed match probabilities do not.
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One can also see this by looking at marginal rates of substitution between cash
and credit market consumption. For the binding case, the MRS is
ϑhu
′(qh)
U ′(c)
= 1 +
i
p
. (29)
Recall from Result 2 that the MRS in the non-binding case is
ϑhu
′(qh)
U ′(c)
= 1. (30)
Without preference shocks (p = 1), cash market consumption thus always depends
on nominal interest rates (MRS = 1 + i). Preference shocks, however, add agents
who are not constrained (p < 1), and whose cash market consumption does not
depend on i (MRS = 1). Since the unconstrained agents do not adjust their con-
sumption in response to changes in i, and are able to adjust their money spending,
they are the only ones who contribute to fluctuations in velocity. For the constrained
agents, the response to price changes is in consumption only, and this adjustment
exactly offsets the price change, so that the total amount of money spent does not
move.
The elasticity of consumption velocity with respect to interest rates can be de-
rived as
εVc,1+i = sc(εc,1+i − εφ,1+i) + scash, nb · εψ,1+i, (31)
where sc is the share of the credit market in total consumption expenditure, and like-
wise scash,nb is the share of cash consumption under non-binding preference shocks.
The last term captures the velocity fluctuations in the cash market, which we study
first.
Lemma 2. Elasticity of the cash market price with respect to the interest rate is
always positive, and is given by
εψ,1+i = ε 1+i
φ
,1+i =
1 + i
σ(p + i)
> 0. (32)
Thus, the less risk-averse the household is, or the smaller the probability of a binding
constraint is, the more of the velocity fluctuations originate in the cash market,
ceteris paribus.
Proof. One can derive that ε 1+i
φ
,1+i = 1− εφ,1+i. Substituting in
εφ,1+i =
1
ε1+i,φ
=
1
1− ε
βE˜φ′,φ
=
ε
φ,βE˜φ′
ε
φ,βE˜φ′
− 1
, (33)
we find
εψ,1+i = ε 1+i
φ
,1+i = 1− εφ,1+i =
−1
ε
φ,βE˜φ′
− 1
Putting the last equation together with (27) yields (32). 
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The remaining terms in (31) are also affected by the presence of idiosyncratic
shocks. To conclude our analytical discussion, let us now incorporate fully the
response of credit-good consumption c to changes in prices and interest rates. To
capture all effects, we drop the assumption that U(c) is linear; then there is also
a general equilibrium feedback effect linking nominal interest rates and velocity,
through the substitution channel between cash and credit market consumption.
The only assumption that we need for analytical tractability is that capital is
constant - while this shuts down one equilibrium effect, and also removes the wedge
between consumption and output velocity, it does not alter the other effects that
we focus on. (Of course, capital fluctuations are an important ingredient of the
computed model in the subsequent sections.)
Proposition 1. The implicit elasticity of consumption velocity with respect to the
nominal interest rate, caused by a one-time fully anticipated money injection (in
addition to the constant rate of money injection consistent with a given steady state
level of 1 + i), is
εVc,1+i = sc
(
1
σ
1 + i
p+ i
− 1
)
+ scash,nb
(
1 + i
p+ i
)(
1
εU ′(c),qh + σ
)
(34)
This elasticity is an equilibrium object: it tells us how the nominal interest rate and
velocity vary when both variables move as a result of a one-time fully anticipated
money injection.
Proof. With abuse of notation, let us call E˜φ′
def
= EU ′(c′)φ′/(1 + $) in this proof.
From the free entry condition U ′(c)q = βEU ′(c′)φ′/(1 + $) = βE˜φ′, we find that
−εqh,1+$ = (εU ′(c),qh + 1)
−1, since U ′(c′)φ′ is unaffected by an anticipated one-time
money injection. Then, relating φ to E˜φ′, from U ′(c)φ = pϑhU
′(qh)qh+(1−p)βE˜φ′,
we find
ε
U ′(c)φ,βE˜φ′
=
d lnU ′(c)φ
d lnβE˜φ′
=
(
p+ i
1 + i
(1− σ)
)
1
εU ′(c),qh + 1
+
1− p
1 + i
. (35)
Then
ε
Vc,βE˜φ′
= sc
{[(
−
1
σ
+ 1
)
εU ′(c),qh −
p+ i
1 + i
(1− σ)
] 1
εU ′(c),qh + 1
−
1− p
1 + i
}
− scash,nb
1
εU ′(c),qh + 1
,
where we can calculate ε
c,βE˜φ′
as
εU′(c),qh
σ(εU′(c),qh
+1) and εqh,βE˜φ′
= −ε
ψ,E˜φ′
as (εU ′(c),qh +
1)−1; ε
φ,βE˜φ′
follows from (35). With ε
βE˜φ′,1+i
= (ε
U ′(c)φ,βE˜φ′
− 1)−1 and ε
U ′(c)φ,βE˜φ′
from (35), we find (34). A detailed proof is in appendix A. 
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Note that the only difference between (35) and (27) is the presence of the term
(εU ′(c),qh + 1)
−1, which captures the general equilibrium feedback of movements of
qh on c, taking into account the optimal labor supply decision. As less is sold
in the decentralized market, less has to be produced in the labor market. This
improves the marginal productivity of labor and raises first-subperiod consumption.
As before, in equation (35), if p = 1, we would need σ ≤ 1 to get a positive sign for
the autocorrelations of prices, real money stock and interest rates, and again, this
constraint is relaxed if p < 1.
In (34), we can recognize the different channels through which idiosyncratic
uncertainty works: (i) credit market effects through the leftmost term; (ii) cash
market channel through the right-most (1 + i)/(p + i) term; and (iii) the general
equilibrium channel, through εU ′(c),qh .
We show these components graphically as a function of σ, in figure 1. We
see that idiosyncratic shocks raise the elasticity of velocity with respect to interest
rates dramatically, as signified by the vertical difference between the second (grey
dashed) and third (black dashed) lines in the graph, and allow for a positive elasticity
for a much larger range of σ (here presented with p = 0.5). We also observe, in
the difference between the top dotted line and the top solid line, that the general
equilibrium effect is small, but works to raise the elasticity of velocity with respect
to the nominal interest rate. Keeping the size of the cash market the same, and
lowering p, it can be shown that the sensitivity of velocity to interest rates through
the cash market channel is raised. Finally note that, without idiosyncratic shocks,
the elasticity of velocity to interest rate is negative if σ > 1.
4 Calibration
The model period is a quarter. The functional forms that we choose are as follows:
U(c) =
c1−σ
1− σ
u(q) =
x1q
1−σ
1− σ
f(k, h) = kθh1−θ.
In total, we need to calibrate the following parameters, given our functional
form choices. The parameters β, σ, A, θ and δ are standard. x1 and the process
for the idiosyncratic shock ϑ determine preferences in the cash market. Finally, the
parameters of the exogenous driving processes {ξ} and the standard deviations σε1
and σε2 have to be calibrated.
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Figure 1: Contributions of Idiosyncratic Uncertainty.
4.1 Preference and Production Parameters
We calibrate the preference and production parameters of the model as follows.
β = 0.9901 matches the annual capital-output ratio of 3. σ = 2 is chosen within,
and on the lower side of, the standard range of 1-4 in the literature. A = 34 is chosen
to match aggregate labor supply of 0.3. The capital share of output is measured
in the data to give θ = 0.36. Quarterly depreciation rate of 2%, consistent with
estimates in the data, gives δ = 0.02.
The constant x1 is calibrated here in two ways. This parameter gives us the size
of the retail (cash) market. It also affects the overall level of velocity in the model.
As a first alternative, we choose x1 to target the size of the retail market, given
other parameters; we choose this size to be 72% of total consumption in the model,
consistent with the aggregate fact, documented in Telyukova(2009), that roughly
75% of the total value of consumer transactions in 2001 took place using liquid
payments methods - cash, checks, and debit cards. This number was quoted at 82%
in 1986 in Wang and Shi (2006), based on a consumer survey. We remain close to
the 2001 target. This produces the parameter x1 = 6.
Alternatively, in a second calibration, we choose x1 to target the average level
of M2 output velocity (Vy) in our data sample (1984-2007, as detailed below). This
level of velocity is 1.897, and it gives us x1 = 1.042, with the associated size of
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Table 1: Two Alternative Calibrations
β σ A x1 θ δ
Calib. 1 (x1 targets cash market size) 0.99 2 34 6 0.36 0.02
Calib. 2 (x1 targets E(V )) 0.99 2 12 1.04 0.36 0.02
the cash market of 50% of total consumption. This calibration also changes the A
parameter given our labor supply target. We will show that the dynamic results
are not very sensitive to the magnitude of x1. Table 1 presents the two alternative
calibrations discussed so far.
4.2 Idiosyncratic Preference Shock Process
We pose the log of the preference shock to be i.i.d. N(0, σϑ).
16 We interpret our
preference shocks as causing fluctuations in household liquid consumption beyond
expected (e.g. seasonal or planned) fluctuations in the data. To calibrate the process
for this shock, we use the same methodology as Telyukova (2009), which estimates a
similar process, except of a persistent nature and at monthly frequency, by matching
time series properties of survey data on liquid household expenditures. We use
quarterly data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX), and restrict attention
to the period 2000-2002. We thus bias the target against our model: before the
mid-1990’s, credit cards were not ubiquitous, so that many more goods could be
considered cash goods than would be today, and these would likely contribute to a
higher volatility estimate.
The key measurement that we need in order to calibrate the shock process is the
unpredictable component of volatility of cash-good consumption in the data. We
take this component of volatility to reflect optimal responses by households to un-
expected preference shocks.17 We will adopt this volatility measure as a calibration
target, and use simulated method of moments (SMM) to estimate the standard devi-
ation of the shock process σϑ such that standard deviation of cash-good consumption
in the model matches the data target.
The process of this measurement of the unpredictable component of liquid con-
16Because of quasilinearity and credit markets in our setting, a shock process of the form ϑ′ = ϑρε′
with ρ > 0 would not change aggregate implications of our model, as can be shown from the first-
order conditions of the problem.
17The preference shocks reflect any situation from being locked out of one’s house to a significant
household repair that requires fairly quick payment by cash or check, e.g. In these situations, not
having the money to meet the expense is very costly, which is well captured by a parameter that
shifts (marginal) utility.
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sumption is described in Telyukova (2009) in detail; here we recap the essential
details. The first step is to separate out cash goods in the CEX data. As our
measure, based on the American Bankers Association’s 2004 survey of consumer
payment methods, we use the following group: food, alcohol, tobacco, rents, mort-
gages, utilities, household repairs, childcare expenses, other household operations,
property taxes, insurance, public transportation, and health insurance. Even in
2004, consumers reported paying for these types of goods with liquid assets (primar-
ily cash and check) in 90% or more of transactions. This proportion would clearly
be higher over our longer period of inquiry, 1984-2007. This measure is also conser-
vative, along some other dimensions, from the standpoint of measuring unexpected
expenses. First, volatility of expenses could be driven by seasonality (e.g. Christ-
mas gift shopping), and to control for that in part, we remove any expenses made
as gifts, which is observable in the CEX; below we also remove seasonality in our
regression analysis. Second, the cash-good category excludes many situations that
may be reflections of emergencies that require liquid payment, such as an emer-
gency purchase of (or downpayment on) a durable to replace - rather than repair -
a broken durable, such as a car or an appliance. Similarly, medical payments, which
include co-pays or other out-of-pocket expenses, some of which are unpredictable
and may require a liquid payment - are not included either; the decision here was
driven by the fact that medical expenses may be payable by credit card today, even
though historically this would not be the case. Thus, in measuring the volatility of
cash-good consumption, using a lot of the “smooth” good categories while excluding
many that may reflect other types of emergencies besides repairs, may understate
the measurement of the uncertainty that households face, against which they may
hold liquid assets.
Using the above definition of cash goods, we take a number of steps to separate
out the idiosyncratic uncertainty component. On the liquid consumption series, we
estimate the following fixed-effect model with AR(1) innovations:
log(cliqit ) = βXit + ui + εit (36)
εit = ρεi,t−1 + ηit.
The vector X includes, depending on specification, household observables, such as
age (a cubic), education, marital status, race, earnings, family size, homeownership
status, as well as seasonal effects (a set of month and year dummies). Several spec-
ifications including different sets of these observables all produced nearly identical
results. ui is the household fixed effect. The residual εit is the idiosyncratic com-
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Table 2: Unpredictable Volatility of Liquid Consumption, Quarterly CEX Data
Standard Deviation of ηit (%)
Benchmark 19.6
Excluding food 27.5
Excluding food and property taxes 29.4
Table 3: Discretized Log-Preference Shock Process
Log-shock standard deviation: σϑ = 0.405
Standard deviation of log-liquid consumption (data/model): 0.196/0.196
lnϑ1 lnϑ2 lnϑ3 lnϑ4 lnϑ5 P(ϑ1) P(ϑ2) P(ϑ3) P(ϑ4) P(ϑ5)
-0.81 -0.40 0 0.40 0.81 0.07 0.24 0.38 0.24 0.07
ponent of liquid consumption, and it further consists of a persistent component and
a transitory component. Since our preference shock is assumed to be i.i.d., we con-
sider the autoregressive component above as predictable, and the innovation ηit as
reflecting household response to the preference shocks. Table 2 presents the stan-
dard deviation of ηit based on our benchmark cash-good measure above, as well as
two alternatives that exclude some of the more predictable expense groups. We will
take the benchmark standard deviation of 19.6% to do our estimation in the model,
clearly the most conservative measure.
The estimate of the standard deviation of the log-preference shock that results
from our SMM procedure is σϑ = 0.4045. We discretize our i.i.d. shock under
the assumption of Gaussian distribution using the Tauchen (1986) method, and
approximate the distribution by 5 discrete shock states, with shocks at maximum
two standard deviations away from their mean. Table 3 presents the discretized
states, where we denote the probability of a discrete shock state ϑi by P(ϑi). Below,
we check robustness of our calibration by discretizing the i.i.d. shocks into 11 shock
states, rather than 5, and find the results to be robust.
Finally, to convince the reader that we do not overstate the amount of uncer-
tainty in expenses through our shock calibration, we plot in figure 2 the steady-state
distribution of the log of liquid consumption in the model, and compare it to the
empirical distribution of the log-consumption residual (ηit), with bins centered at
the same states as in the model. What is key for the quantitative performance of
the model is that we capture the probability of binding shocks correctly; in our
5-state calibration, this is reflected in the top consumption state, as only the top
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Steady State Distribution of Consumption States, 5 Shocks
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Data Model
Figure 2: Log-Consumption Distribution in Model and Data
Table 4: Estimates of the Aggregate Shock Processes, 1984-2007
ξzz ξii ξipi ξiy σε1 σε2
0.944 0.780 0.133 0.011 0.006 0.001
shock binds in our calibrated equilibrium. From the figure, it is apparent that our
calibration captures the probability of the top state accurately.
4.3 Aggregate Shock Processes
Finally, we calibrate technology and monetary policy shocks. We model these as
two separate processes, as described above. We estimate in our data sample the
following two regressions:
zt = ξzzzt−1 + ε1
ln
(
1 + it
1 + i¯
)
= ξii ln
(
1 + it−1
1 + i¯
)
+ ξipi ln
(
1 + pit−1
1 + p¯i
)
+ ξiy ln
(
yt−1
y¯
)
+ ε2
zt is the Solow residual measured in the standard way, and we take out the linear
trend from both the Solow residual and the output series. The variables with bars
over them capture long-term averages of the respective variables in our sample pe-
riod, as is standard in estimating central banks’ targets in policy rules. The sample
of data on which we estimate this process is from 1984 until 2007, to capture the
period when the Federal Reserve is perceived to have begun using (implicit) inflation
targeting. Notice that our interest rate rule depends on endogenous variables. We
use the Federal Funds rate as the measure of choice of interest rates in the data.
The resulting coefficients are in table 4.
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5 Computation
We employ the Parameterized Expectations Approach (PEA) to solve the model.
The method approximates the expectations terms in our Euler equation system (25)
- two in total - by polynomial functions of the state variables, and the coefficients
of the approximation and solved for. We choose the following forms:
E
[
(c′)−σ(1 + ez
′
θ(k′)θ−1(h′)1−θ − δ)
]
= ψ1(χ, ; γ1) (37)
E
[
1
w′
]
=
E˜
w
= ψ2(χ; γ2)
where,
ψj(χ; γj) = γj1 exp(γ
j
2 log k + γ
j
3 log z + γ
j
4 log i−1 + γ
j
5 log i+ γ
j
6 log[φ−1(1 +$−1)])
The accuracy of approximation can be increased by raising the degree of approx-
imating polynomials above; we have experimented with several forms and found the
results robust to them. We find that the convergence properties of our model are
good: convergence is monotone and very robust. In order to compute moments from
the model, we re-run the model solution 100 times given parameters of the model,
and the simulations within each run are for 10,000 periods, where we discard the
first 1,000 in computing the moments.
6 Results
In this section, we describe our results with respect to the dynamics of nominal
and real variables, and show how the presence of precautionary demand affects the
quantitative performance of our model. We also show sensitivity results for our
different calibration strategies, described above, as well as examine robustness of
preference shock discretization with more states.
6.1 The Role of Precautionary Money Demand
We choose M2 as the basis for analysis of the data, to follow Hodrick et al (1991)
and Wang and Shi (2006), among others. Another reason of using this aggregate is
that it exhibits much more stationarity over time than M1. Finally, in our micro
data work, we think of liquid payment methods as not only cash, but also checks
and debit cards, which implies inclusion in the monetary aggregate of checking and
savings accounts.18
18Strictly speaking, this makes our model’s money concept fall between M1 and M2, however, for
the reasons mentioned, we think of M2 as the appropriate approximation.
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To highlight the role of precautionary demand for money in generating the quan-
titative results that we present, we compute, throughout this section, two versions
of our model: one is the benchmark as presented above; the other is the benchmark
with the preference shocks shut down. Specifically, in this version, we assign to
everyone the highest preference shock with probability 1; this means that everyone’s
cash constraint binds at all times. We refer to this version of the model as the no-
shock model; we think of it as closely replicating standard cash-credit good models
with only aggregate risk.
Table 5 summarizes the results concerning the dynamic properties of some key
nominal variables. The first column of the table presents results in the data. The
second column presents the results for the no-shock model. The last two columns
show the results in our benchmark model with the two alternative calibrations for
x1 - one targeting the cash-market size of 72% of consumption, the other - targeting
E(Vy). Besides this moment, we are not targeting any of our result moments in
calibration, so that the model is left free in terms of its dynamic performance.
Table 5: Dynamic Properties of the Model
Moment Data No-Shock Model Full Model Full Model
(Calibration 1) (Calibration 2)
E(Vy) 1.897 1.812 1.357 1.898
E(Vc) 1.120 1.380 1.033 1.445
σ(Vy) 0.017 0.010 0.014 0.014
σ(Vc) 0.014 0.0002 0.012 0.011
σ(y) 0.009 0.012 0.012 0.012
σ(1 + i) 0.0026 0.001 0.002 0.002
corr(Vy, y) 0.638 0.993 0.585 0.602
corr(Vy, gy) 0.059 0.289 0.142 0.145
corr(Vc, gy) -0.094 0.110 -0.071 -0.070
corr(Vy, gc) 0.127 0.539 0.233 0.262
corr(Vc, gc) -0.027 0.176 -0.155 -0.139
corr(Vy, 1 + i) 0.714 -0.210 0.645 0.638
corr(Vc, 1 + i) 0.690 -0.896 0.897 0.897
εVy ,1+i 5.072 -1.747 4.546 4.469
εVc,1+i 4.158 -0.123 5.072 4.994
corr(1 + pi, 1 + i) 0.529 0.768 0.361 0.358
All data logged and BP filtered. Data period: 1984-2007. Velocity moments calculated based
on M2. Interest rate is the Fed Funds rate. Inflation measured based on GDP deflator. gy refers
to output growth. “No-Shock” model is the version of the model with idiosyncratic preference
shocks shut down. All model moments are computed from 100 repetitions of model solution,
with simulations of 10,000 periods each. Calibration 1 sets parameter x1 to target cash-market
size of 72% of total consumption. Calibration 2 sets x1 to target E(Vy).
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As is clear from the table, precautionary motive for holding money makes an
enormous difference for the performance of the model: without it, the model is
not able to capture almost any of the moments in the data, while introducing pre-
cautionary demand makes the model align quite successfully on nearly all of the
dimensions listed. When we do not target mean output velocity, we underpredict
the level of both velocity measures by a bit. In our model, as in other monetary
business cycle models, money turns over only once a quarter, so it is not surprising
that when we do not target mean velocity, we do not get the level high enough. It
is also not surprising that in the no-shock model, mean velocity is higher than in
the model with shocks; when the cash constraint is always binding, the cash market
contributes exactly 1 to velocity level every period. In the model with shocks, that
contribution is less than 1 for all the non-binding shock realizations; all but 7% of
the households do not spend all of their money, and hence contribute less than 1
to velocity. When we do target output velocity level, we overpredict consumption
velocity level slightly.
In terms of volatility of velocity, as our analytical results suggested, we do much
better in the model with the preference shocks than in the model without. Even with
our relatively low risk aversion parameter (a parameter that needed to be high in
both Hodrick et al (1991) andWang and Shi (2006) to begin to get significant velocity
volatility), the model with the preference uncertainty gets close to the data in terms
of the volatility of velocity. For output velocity, the model with the preference shocks
produces 40% higher volatility than the no-shock model; for consumption velocity,
the benchmark produces 60 times the volatility of the no-shock model. As discussed
in our theory section, the reason is that with the introduction of preference shocks,
the cash market contributes significantly to volatility of velocity, whereas it would
contribute nothing if the cash constraint were always binding. Notice also that
in the model with precautionary demand, we get the proportion of consumption
velocity to output velocity volatility right, while it is very far off target in the no-
shock model. Since consumption velocity is the major component of output velocity,
consumption expenditure being 75% of GDP, the no-shock model is an unsatisfying
theory of velocity dynamics because these dynamics come from the wrong source in
that model.
Due to the properties of our exogenous driving process, we overpredict output
volatility slightly and equally in both the benchmark and the no-shock model. The
latter, however, underpredicts volatility of velocity substantially, leading us to con-
clude that the overprediction of output volatility is immaterial in creating excess
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Table 6: Properties of Velocity Volatility
Moment Data No-Shock Model Full Model Full Model
(Calibration 1) (Calibration 2)
σ(M/P ) 0.013 0.003 0.012 0.012
corr(Vy, Vy,−1) 0.941 0.898 0.898 0.899
corr(Vc, Vc,−1) 0.937 0.896 0.898 0.899
corr(pi, pi−1) 0.901 0.870 0.844 0.844
corr(M/P,M/P−1) 0.944 0.921 0.898 0.898
All data logged and BP filtered. Model: average of 100 runs.
velocity volatility.
Continuing down the list, the model with preference shocks replicates most mo-
ments very well, and much better than the model without shocks. As we analyzed
in the model section, we expect that for the risk aversion parameter σ > 1, as it
is here, the correlation of velocity with nominal interest rates (and the respective
elasticity) will be negative in the no-shock model, counter to the data. The relevant
rows in the table confirm this: with the preference shocks, the relationship between
velocity and nominal interest rates has the correct sign and magnitude; without
shocks, it is significantly negative. The correlations of output with growth of output
and consumption also flip signs relative to data if the model has no idiosyncratic
preference risk; with the shocks, the signs are correct, and the magnitudes are close
to the data for the most part. Finally, it is apparent that either calibration of the
benchmark produces almost the same results with respect to all of the moments
listed.
Table 6 presents the dynamic behavior of real balances (M/P ), as well as the
autocorrelations of velocity, inflation and real balances. These moments, all close
to the data in the benchmark model, show that velocity volatility does not come
from excessive volatility in the value of the money stock or from volatility at the
wrong frequency. Note also that in the no-shock model, volatility of real balances
is extremely low relative to the data, again implying that it is unable to reproduce
dynamics of the sources of velocity fluctuations.
6.2 Some Other Aggregate Facts
We now assess the performance of our model according to an additional set of facts,
listed by Cooley and Hansen (1995) as some of the more significant monetary features
of business cycles. A first set of these facts is presented in table 7. The first two
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Table 7: More Monetary Business Cycle Facts
Moment Data Model CH data CH
corr(V, y) 0.64 0.58 0.37 0.948
corr(p, y) -0.13 -0.28 -0.57 -0.22
corr(gm, y) -0.11 -0.15 -0.12 -0.01
corr(gm, pi) -0.06 -0.13 -0.29 0.92
All data logged and BP filtered. All model moments are com-
puted from 100 repetitions of model solution, with simulations
of 10,000 periods. Benchmark calibration 1.
columns list the performance of our model (Calibration 1) against the data, while
the second two show the comparable moments from the Cooley and Hansen sample,
and their own performance along this dimension. The facts are that velocity is
procyclical, prices are countercyclical, and that correlation of output and inflation
with the growth of money supply is negative. We match these facts in the model
and get the magnitudes of the correlations about right.
Finally, we want to highlight some aspects of the data that we are not so suc-
cessful in capturing. As is clear from table 8, our model, as the previous models
in its class, misses the liquidity effect, i.e. the negative correlation of nominal in-
terest rates with money growth, and prices and inflation are too flexible relative
to data. All of this produces the series of moments replicated in this table. The
Cooley-Hansen cash-in-advance model is again presented as a point of comparison
and similarly misses these moments. In general, it is not surprising that our prices
are completely flexible - we do not build in any frictions to change the speed and
magnitude of price adjustment - and that we miss the liquidity effect, partly as a
result of this. Sluggish adjustment of prices, as for example in Alvarez, Atkeson
and Edmond (2008), is difficult to incorporate without a mechanism like market
segmentation. We do not target this mechanism and hence did not expect to get
the liquidity effect right.
Appendix B shows additional dynamic results from the model via cross-correlations
of some real and nominal variables with output.
6.3 Sensitivity Analysis: 11 Preference Shock States
We also test for sensitivity of our results to how we discretize the idiosyncratic
preference shock. In our benchmark case, we estimate the continuous AR(1) process
with 5 discrete shock states. We also tried alternatives with 3 to 11 discrete states.
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Table 8: Liquidity Effect
Moment Data Model CH data CH
corr(gm, i) -0.7(M1)/0.07(M2) 0.79 -0.27 0.72
corr(y, i) 0.54 -0.13 0.40 -0.01
corr(y, pi) 0.37 -0.25 0.34 -0.14
corr(gm, p) 0.03 0.61 -0.16 0.43
All data logged and BP filtered. All model moments are computed from 100
repetitions of model solution, with simulations of 10,000 periods.
Table 9: Discretized Log-Preference Shock Process, 11 States
lnϑi -0.81 -0.65 -0.49 -0.32 -0.16 0.00 0.16 0.32 0.49 0.65 0.81
P(ϑi) 0.036 0.045 0.078 0.116 0.146 0.159 0.146 0.116 0.078 0.045 0.036
The only thing that can change under alternatives with more than five discrete states
is the number of binding shocks and the probability of these: with just five, only
the top shock always binds, with constant probability; with eleven, the top two, and
sometimes the top three, can bind. Regardless, we have found the results to be very
robust. The alternative calibration of the shocks, and the respective results, in a
comparison with data and the benchmark model with five shock states, are presented
in tables 9 and 10. As is clear from the results table, under this parameterization,
the dynamic properties of the model are extremely similar to those of the model
with five discrete shock states.
7 The Pitfalls of Standard Calibration under Omission
of Precautionary Demand
If precautionary demand for money is omitted from the model, the standard practice
of calibrating monetary models to aggregate money demand, which may have a
significant precautionary component, would likely produce misleading parameter
values and thus affect the quantitative performance of the model. To demonstrate
this here, we perform the following test. We take, again, a version of our benchmark
model with the preference shocks shut down, so that the cash constraint always
binds. But instead of fixing the calibration to the benchmark, as we did above, we
will now calibrate the model to two standard targets in the monetary literature: the
expected value of velocity, E(Vy), and the elasticity of inverse velocity with respect
30
Table 10: Sensitivity: Dynamic Properties of the Model, 11 Shock States
Moment Data 5 Shock States (benchmark) 11 Shock States
E(Vy) 1.897 1.357 1.395
E(Vc) 1.120 1.033 1.063
σ(Vy) 0.017 0.014 0.015
σ(Vc) 0.014 0.012 0.012
σ(y) 0.009 0.012 0.012
σ(1 + i) 0.0026 0.002 0.002
corr(Vy, y) 0.638 0.585 0.569
corr(Vy, gy) 0.059 0.142 0.163
corr(Vc, gy) -0.094 -0.071 -0.039
corr(Vy, gc) 0.127 0.233 0.247
corr(Vc, gc) -0.027 -0.155 -0.130
corr(Vy, 1 + i) 0.714 0.645 0.629
corr(Vc, 1 + i) 0.690 0.897 0.863
εVy ,1+i 5.072 4.546 4.448
εVc,1+i 4.158 5.072 4.940
corr(1 + pi, 1 + i) 0.529 0.361 0.288
Both models calibrated to target cash market size of 72% of total consumption.
to the nominal interest rate, −εV,1+i. This exercise produces different values for
parameters x1, A and, most importantly, σ - the value of relative risk aversion.
These alternative values are presented in table 11. The model without preference
shocks can only reproduce the monetary targets with the value of σ = 0.15.19 This
is extremely low relative to the standard range of σ used in calibrated real business
cycle models, and very low relative to our benchmark calibration for the model with
preference shocks, which reproduces the same targets with σ = 2. But it is not
surprising that such a low value is needed: we showed analytically that the no-shock
model cannot get the sign of the elasticity of velocity with respect to nominal interest
rates right unless σ < 1.
The dynamic properties of this model are presented in table 12, where we com-
pare our benchmark model calibrated to match E(Vy) (Calibration 2) with the no-
shock model with the same target. It is apparent that even when targeting E(V ) and
εV,1+i, the model does badly along other nominal dimensions, even when it comes
to the same quantities pertaining to consumption velocity, and now the quantitative
19Values of σ very close to this commonly arise in monetary models without precautionary money
demand, from sticky-price models (Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997) to monetary search models
(Lagos and Wright, 2005).
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Table 11: Targeting Money Demand in Data without Precautionary Money Demand
in Model
β σ A x1 θ δ
0.990 0.15 3.10 0.508 0.36 0.02
implications on the real side of the model suffer noticeably as well. For instance,
here the no-shock model overstates volatility of output, consumption and investment
significantly, doubling these volatilities relative to data, while the benchmark gets
these standard deviation measures fairly close to the data. In other words, even if
we were willing to accept the calibrated parameters that this exercise requires, the
results that the model produces are far inferior to the performance of our benchmark
with preference shocks. This is true along both nominal and real dimensions, even
though the model is rigged, in how it is parameterized, to do well quantitatively
on the nominal side. Without precautionary demand in this setting, it seems to
be impossible to match both real and nominal facts at the same time. Modeling
precautionary demand for money solves this problem.
All of this is relevant, because it suggests that omitting precautionary money de-
mand from monetary models may produce inaccurate results in not only matching
data facts, but also conducting policy experiments and drawing normative conclu-
sions.
8 Welfare Costs of Inflation
In our model, changes in steady state inflation distort cash-good consumption only
for the binding shock realizations, while at the same time, households value this
consumption more than average, and are therefore more sensitive to these distor-
tions. Thus, incorporating idiosyncratic uncertainty adds two opposing forces to
the welfare costs of inflation relative to a model without precautionary demand. It
could depend on the values of the parameters which of the two forces dominates.
Comparing steady states, we calculate the welfare cost of inflation as the percentage
reduction in consumption under the Friedman Rule (or zero inflation) that would
make a household indifferent between the Friedman Rule and a higher-inflation state.
This measure is 1−∆, with
U(∆c(pib)) + E[ϑu(∆qϑ(pib))] = U(c(pi)) + E[ϑu(qϑ(pi))],
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Table 12: No-Shock Model Targeting Money Demand in the Data
Moment Data Benchmark No-Shock Model
(Calibration 2) (Target Money Demand)
E(Vy) 1.897 1.898 1.895
E(Vc) 1.120 1.445 1.442
σ(Vy) 0.017 0.014 0.028
σ(Vc) 0.014 0.011 0.003
σ(y) 0.009 0.012 0.022
σ(c) 0.005 0.003 0.012
σ(inv) 0.050 0.044 0.114
σ(1 + i) 0.0026 0.002 0.002
corr(Vy, y) 0.638 0.602 0.905
corr(Vy, gy) 0.059 0.145 0.411
corr(Vc, gy) -0.094 -0.070 -0.185
corr(Vy, gc) 0.127 0.262 0.323
corr(Vc, gc) -0.027 -0.139 0.256
corr(Vy, 1 + i) 0.714 0.638 0.333
corr(Vc, 1 + i) 0.690 0.897 0.999
εVy ,1+i 5.072 4.469 5.030
εVc,1+i 4.158 4.994 1.763
corr(1 + pi, 1 + i) 0.529 0.358 0.657
Benchmark with five shock states, calibrated to target E(Vy). Bolded quantities represent
calibration targets.
where the argument in c(.), q(.) denotes the corresponding level of inflation - either
pib, the benchmark cases of Friedman rule or zero inflation, or pi, some level of
inflation greater than pib. Manipulating the expression, we get
∆ =
(
c(pi)1−σ +
∑
ϑ P(ϑ)ϑqϑ(pi)
1−σ
c(pib)1−σ +
∑
ϑ P(ϑ)ϑqϑ(pib)
1−σ
) 1
1−σ
. (38)
We are able to derive the steady state quantities in closed form (see appendix C), and
graph the welfare cost as a function of the yearly inflation rate. The dashed (red)
line in figure 3 is the portion of welfare cost coming from consumption distortion
only under the top idiosyncratic shock, which always binds, while the solid (blue)
line graphs the total welfare cost. The dashed line is meant to parallel a model in
which the total proportion of households who are at the binding cash constraint is
constant regardless of the inflation level, as would be the case in a model without
idiosyncratic uncertainty. The solid line incorporates the other margin - that as the
level of inflation rises, so does the share of constrained households - which is a margin
present in our model, and one that makes a significant quantitative difference, as is
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Figure 3: Welfare Cost of Inflation (Benchmark: Friedman Rule)
shown below. In the left panel of figure 3, we can see that the welfare cost of 10%
(yearly) inflation compared with the Friedman rule is 1.58% of the efficient level of
consumption, and about 1.2% of output. Compared with 0% inflation, the welfare
cost is about 1.46% of consumption, and about 1.1% of output. These numbers
are somewhat larger than the numbers in Cooley and Hansen (1989) who report,
in a slightly different calculation, welfare costs of about 0.5%, but very similar to
numbers in Lucas (2000) and Lagos and Wright (2005).20
In the right panel we see where the changing proportion of households at a
binding cash constraint starts to matter for the magnitude of the welfare cost. At
higher levels of inflation, between 100% and 400%, it is evident that extrapolating
the welfare cost from low-inflation states, where in our calibration only the highest
shock binds, leads to an underestimate. At 400% inflation, where in our calibration
three out of five shocks bind, thus making the share of constrained households much
higher than in low-inflation states, this underestimate is significant: 3.5 percentage
points out of a total of 15.3% of consumption. As the precautionary motive seems
prevalent in the data, a model with a full distribution of idiosyncratic shocks allows
us to give a better approximation of welfare costs at higher levels of inflation than
models which assume that the cash constraint always binds, and in which the share
of consumption subject to this constraint is calibrated using velocity in low-inflation
data.
20Lucas (2000) derives a welfare cost of 1.5% for 10% inflation for the log-log money demand
with elasticity 0.5, and Lagos and Wright (2005) calculate 1.4% of consumption relative to zero
inflation, and 1.6% of consumption relative to the Friedman rule, in their annual calibration, with
take-it-or-leave-it pricing.
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9 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the aggregate implications of precautionary demand for
money. We highlight the importance of modeling uninsurable idiosyncratic risk in
preferences as a cause of precautionary motive for holding liquidity. By incorporating
this idiosyncratic risk into a standard monetary model with aggregate risk, and by
carefully calibrating the idiosyncratic shocks to data, we find that the model matches
many dynamic moments of nominal variables well, and greatly improves on the
performance of existing monetary models that do not incorporate such idiosyncratic
shocks. We show that our results are robust to multiple possible ways of calibrating
the model. We show also that omitting precautionary demand while targeting, in
calibration, data properties of money demand - a standard calibration practice -
produces inferior performance in terms of matching the data, potentially misleading
implications for parameters of the model, and may therefore adversely affect the
model’s policy implications as well.
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A Detailed Proof of Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. The implicit elasticity of consumption velocity with respect to the
nominal interest rate, caused by a one-time fully anticipated money injection (in
addition to the constant rate of money injection consistent with a given steady state
level of 1 + i), is
εVc,1+i = sc
(
1
σ
1 + i
p+ i
− 1
)
+ scash,nb
(
1 + i
p+ i
)(
1
εU ′(c),qh + σ
)
(39)
Proof. The elasticity of velocity with respect to a change in the interest rate (caused
by a one-time anticipated additional injection of money 1 +$) is
εVc,1+i =
d lnVc
d ln 1 +$
/ d ln 1 + i
d ln 1 +$
Velocity is given by
Vc =
PC
M
=
c
φ
+ (1− p)
ql(1 + i)
φ
+ p
qh(1 + i)
φ
,
hence,
εVc,1+$ = sc(εc,1+$ − εφ,1+$)− scash,nbεqh,1+$,
using εψ,1+$ = −εqh,1+$.
Since a one-time fully anticipated money injection does not affect tomorrow’s φ
or U ′(c′), we formulate the elasticities in terms of E˜φ′, which for the duration of the
proof we define as E˜φ′
def
= U ′(c′)φ′/(1 +$); then ε
1+$,βE˜φ′
= −1, and
εVc,1+i = εVc,E˜φ′/ε1+i,E˜φ′ .
To derive ε
c,E˜φ′
, let us derive how h varies with c in the equilibrium. From
equation (18), the elasticity is
εc,h = −
α
σ
, εU ′(c),h = α (40)
Now, from the household budget constraint, we use (40) to derive
εc,qh = −
sqh
sc +
1−α
α
σ
, εU ′(c),qh =
sqhσ
sc +
1−α
α
σ
> 0, (41)
where sqh is the share of total output going to qh consumption, sqh = (pqh)/Y ;
likewise sc = c/Y . Moreover, εc,qh = −
1
σ
εU ′(c),qh .
21
21Equation (41) captures the general equilibrium effect from changes in qh: a shift away from cash
consumption will lead to an increase in credit market consumption. This effect is proportional to the
share of cash consumption under the binding shock in total consumption. In case of idiosyncratic
uncertainty, sqh is smaller (by a factor smaller than p) than total cash market consumption, and
hence the elasticity in equation (41) is smaller.
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The free entry condition now allows us to link tomorrow’s value of money E˜φ′ to
today’s movements in qh. Free entry gives U
′(c)qh = βE˜φ′ (which is consistent with
qh = βE˜φ′ in the old definition), which means that
ε
qh,βE˜φ
′
=
1
εU ′(c),qh + 1
, (42)
leading to
ε
c,βE˜φ′
= −
εU ′(c),qh
σ(εU ′(c),qh + 1)
. (43)
To calculate ε
φ,βE˜φ′
, use
U ′(c)φ = pϑu′(qh)
βE˜φ′
U ′(c)
+ (1− p)βE˜φ′ = pϑu′(qh)qh + (1− p)βE˜φ′, (44)
derived from the FOCs of m, qh, to find
d ln φ
d ln βE˜φ′
=
pϑhu
′(qh)qh
pϑhu′(qh)qh + (1− p)βE˜φ′
d ln(u′(qh)qh)
d ln qh
d ln qh
dβE˜φ′
+
(1− p)βE˜φ′
pϑhu′(qh)qh + (1− p)βE˜φ′
−
d lnU ′(c)
d ln qh
d ln qh
d ln E˜φ′
, (45)
Combining (45) and (44), we find
ε
φ,E˜φ′
=
(
p+ i
1 + i
(1− σ)− εU ′(c),qh
)
1
εU ′(c),qh + 1
+
1− p
1 + i
. (46)
Likewise, we can calculate
ε
U ′(c)φ,E˜φ′
=
d lnU ′(c)φ
d lnβU ′(c′)φ′
=
(
p+ i
1 + i
(1− σ)
)
1
εU ′(c),qh + 1
+
1− p
1 + i
. (47)
With ε
βE˜φ′,1+i
= (ε
U ′(c)φ,βE˜φ′
− 1)−1 and ε
U ′(c)φ,βE˜φ′
from (47), we find
ε
1+i,E˜φ′
= −
(
1 + i
p+ i
·
εU ′(c),qh + 1
εU ′(c),qh + σ
)
. (48)
Now we are able to calculate the elasticity of velocity with respect to E˜φ′.
ε
Vc,βE˜φ′
=
d lnVc
d ln E˜φ′
= −
d ln V
d ln 1 +$
= −εVc,1+$
= sc
( d ln c
d ln E˜φ′
−
d ln φ
d ln E˜φ′
)
+ scash,nb
d lnψ
d ln E˜φ′
= sc
(((
−
1
σ
+ 1
)
εU ′(c),qh −
p+ i
1 + i
(1− σ)
) 1
εU ′(c),qh + 1
−
1− p
1 + i
)
− scash,nb
1
εu′(c),qh + 1
. (49)
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From (49) it follows that, for p = 1, this elasticity is negative if σ < 1; for p < 1, a
larger σ will also lead to a negative elasticity. Combining (48) and (49) yields
εVc,1+i =
(
1 + i
p+ i
·
εU ′(c),qh + 1
εU ′(c),qh + σ
)
× (50)(
sc
{[(
1
σ
− 1
)
εU ′(c),qh +
p+ i
1 + i
(1− σ)
]
1
εU ′(c),qh + 1
+
1− p
1 + i
}
+ scash,nb
1
εu′(c),qh + 1
)
,
which simplifies to
εVc,1+i = sc
(
1
σ
1 + i
p+ i
− 1
)
+ scash,nb
(
1 + i
p+ i
)(
1
εU ′(c),qh + σ
)
(51)
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Figure 4: Cross-Correlations of Endogenous Variables with Output
To analyze our performance further with respect to facts highlighted by Cooley and
Hansen, we present cross-correlations of several endogenous variables with output in
graphical form, in figures 4 - 6. Where possible, we also graph the cross-correlations
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presented by Cooley and Hansen from their model.22 With respect to the correla-
tions of real variables with output, we do as well as the Cooley-Hansen model, or
better. A notable improvement in our model relative to Cooley and Hansen concerns
the dynamic pattern of output velocity (bottom right panel): we match the data for
M2 velocity a lot more closely than they did. This last fact is the product of adding
precautionary demand for money into the model; we further demonstrate this in
figure 5 which shows the same cross-correlations, but comparing our benchmark to
our no-shock model. In the bottom right panel, it is clear that the model with
preference shocks does a lot better at matching the data than the model without.
The other three panels of that figure also show that the improvement in dynamic
patterns of real variables relative to Cooley-Hansen results in large part from our
driving processes, rather than from preference shocks: we use an interest rate rule,
while Cooley and Hansen used a money growth rule.
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Figure 5: Cross-Correlations of Endogenous Variables with Output, Benchmark vs
No-Shock Model
Finally, in figure 6 we present some further cross-correlations that we get less
well. While we get the dynamic pattern of money supply half-right (although our
cross-correlation bottoms out later than the data suggest), and we improve on Cooley
22Obviously, this comparison is limited in that their model is calibrated to a different time period;
we do not present their data for space reasons.
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and Hansen’s cross-correlation of nominal interest rates, we get neither these two,
nor the dynamic patterns of prices and inflation. Our performance on the bottom
two panels is fairly close to Cooley and Hansen’s. Again, we do not expect to get
the patterns of prices to replicate the data with a price adjustment mechanism that
is as flexible and frictionless as ours.
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Figure 6: Cross-Correlations of Endogenous Variables with Output
C Steady State Consumption in Closed Form
We have to solve both for credit market and cash market consumption in order to
conduct the welfare cost experiment. From the characterizing equation system (25),
we get steady-state credit market consumption, after substituting in the capital-
labor ratio, from
c¯ =
[
A
1− θ
(
1
θ
(
1
β
− 1 + δ
)) θ
1−θ
]− 1
σ
.
To get cash market consumption we again appeal to the system (25). The issue
for the welfare-cost analysis is that as inflation rate increases, more of the discrete
shocks cause the cash constraint to bind. Thus, we solve in closed form here for the
general case: suppose that the total number of discrete shock states is n and k of
these shocks, from ϑn−k+1 to ϑn, bind. For any binding shock, the following system
holds, given our functional forms:
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µ¯ϑi = P(ϑi)
(
ϑix1q¯
1−σ
ϑi
c¯σ −
φ¯
1 + i¯
)
∀ i ∈ {n− k + 1, k}
φ¯ =
(
1 + i¯
i¯
) k∑
i=n−k+1
µ¯ϑi
q¯ϑi =
φ¯
1 + i¯
∀ i ∈ {n− k + 1, k}.
From this, one can solve for the relevant µϑi , which then determine φ, and finally q
in all the binding states, which is a function of the nominal interest rate but not of
the binding shock level, as expected. Instead, in the remaining (non-binding) states,
consumption is given simply by
q¯ϑi = (ϑixi)
1
σ c¯ ∀ i ∈ {1, n − k},
and is not a function of the nominal interest rate, but does change with the level of
the non-binding shock.
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